Counterproliferation of biology weapons by Collins, Raymond P.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1995-09
Counterproliferation of biology weapons
Collins, Raymond P.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7561















Thesis Advisor: Patrick J. Parker 






Approved for publ ic release; dislribution is \lnlimit ed. 








Approved by: --- =."'p'car:Ck"er:=,"""ThOCe-cc,­i sc-cAa".vc-!i-=-eo"r,­-­-­
K  
Frank N. Teti Chatrman, 
Department of Nationa l Security liEf airs 

1001 
,,J"· ...· DUOl i'M<NOlU.JWRYI 
NAVAL POSTGRAOUATe SCHOOL 
MONTEREY CA Q3943.SI01 
ABSTRACT 
When :he Bio logical Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1972, the ballie 
infec tious disease appeared to have been WOIl and the biological warfare prO!jrams ot' 
tile Urlited States and Sovlrl Union , eemed 10 be il lelevant in the global connie! dom inated 
st rategic r:uclear weapons. The end of the Cold War, the A1DS epidemic arld the 
biotechnology revo lution have shattered the parad igm of 1972 Offensive biological warl3TC 
nwy now be II viable th l-em. The f.rsl .::hapler evalua tes the uti l;ty of biological warfare in a 
tactica l battlefield scenario, d STralegic 5cc~ano, and II special forces or terror iSl sc("nario The 
<;cc0nd chaplet c~aln ln es the stages jr] the deve l opFl~e r. t of an otfensive program lind how the 
biotechnology revo lution has faci lita ted them. Chapler three exami nes Ihe decision to use 
bio logica l and d:ernical weilpon~ arld what c~ n be dOrle 10 deter that decision 
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may pose the kind of 
25 countr ies hostile to 
In NO\if!mber 1969, when Pres iaent N ixon un ilaterally renounced the use of 
tJio logical weapons, the battle aga inst infectious aisease In the deve loped wor ld 
appeared to have bf!en won The discover)' of ant ibiot ics and the deve lopment of 
vaccines had all but stopped rilass epidemics. Smallpox, ".vhich had wiped out huge 
segments of ind;genous populations as Europeans colon ized the globe, was on the 
verge of erad ication 1 
Mili tary bio log ical wariare (BW) progri'lms in the Un ited States and Sov iet 
Union begu" dur·ng Wor ld War II seemed to be Irrelevant In Ine global conflIct 
dominated by stra tegic nUClear weapons. Based on the fo llowing mil itary criteria 
tor an 'deal biological weapon , nel\her side had produced a weapon WhiCh would 
orav ide a decisive advantage on the battlefie ld 
., ctcb~li l~~' Ihe d cc i ~I() 1l to de~;tr(1y Ille rcm ainmg samples. (Wagller, p. WH -8) 
11 
Ideal Biological Warfare Agent 
Highly virulent, consistently causing disease or death at low 
concentrations and infective multiple routes , such as 
respiration, ingestion and 
Highly contagious--if possible, transmiss ible from specific animals to 
humans, but with lim ited general spillover that would create an 
unconl roltable epidemic among many species 
Short , predictable incubation period from exposure to onse~ of 
symptoms 
Oenlable--either endemic to the target region or causing symptoms that 
mimic those of endemic diseases 
Medica l defense difficult--target population or army should have littl e 
or no natural or acquired Immunity and little recourse 10 Immediate , 
effective prophylaxIs or medical treatment 
as well as decontamination methods 
civilians, and ult imately, target 
groups after occupat ion 
Suitable for economical mass production In mllitanly significant 
quantities from available raw malenals. 
Stable witllin munitions during storage and 
amenable to dissemination aerosot spraying, 
tc8'''0''' '8''0' . 
vectors (such as mosqUitos 
10 effective--the attack shou ld produce term, 
poss ible to reduce the risk of generalized to 
(Piller, pp. 93-94, Geissler, PP 21-22, U S Congress, p 
The Nixon biolog ical weapons disarmament initiat ive wh ich COInCidCd with the 
rat if icat ion of the Nuc lear Nonprol i ferat i o~, Treaty ana st rategic arms limitati on 
negotiations (Naughton, "Nixon Renounce s , P 1) c'.J lminated in the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)2 The BWC was the f irs t true disarmament 
convention. Unlike the 1925 Geneva Protocol which on ly out lawed the use of 
chemical and biotog lca l weapons in warfare , the BWC banned biologica l and tox ic 
weapons development, production , stockp il ing and mandatcd the destruction of any 
eXlstlllg weapons. (BWC Art. I-III) Thc BWC IS nond iscriminatory , Imposing the 
same responslb:litles on all states , (Pliler, pp 162-163) Due to the International 
po lit ica l constrai nts of H1C time, ttlC more cor>te'1tious Issue of chemica l weapons 
disarmament was deferred to prevent de lay of the BWC The BWC d'd not create 
an internal iO'1a l treaty oversight organlzatio-; li ke the Internat iona l Atom ic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), so compliance was left to nat ional, rather than internat ional , means 
Verif icat ion of comollance was recognized as an inherent weakness of the 
cO'1Ventlon, but more comprehens ive measures such as on site Inspect ion and 
coordinated expor1 controls were not pol itically v iable in 1972 (Geiss ler, pp 82-86 
& 138-146) 
The world has radically changed since 1972 The Cold War, which defined 
Ea::;t West relations for f ifty years , is over. The Soviet Union and its Eastern 
European empire imploded under its own weight. This new po li tica l reality allowed 
the comp letion of the long delayed chemica l weapons disarmament negotiations 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), wh ich contai ns prov is ions for 
internationa l on-site inspections to verify compliance opened for s ignature in 
January , 1993. (eWC, Art. IX) 
The AIDS epidem ic and the discovery of even more deadly pa thogens such 
as Embola VIrUS have shattered the illusion that man has conquered infectious 
disease . New strains of diseases, such as tubercu losis , that are resistant to 
treatment are now a grave concern of the med ical community (Krieger, p. A-14) 
SCience and technology have also rad ically changed what is poss ible In the 
field of mo lecu lar biology . Even as the BWC was be ing f ina li zed some of the 
assumpt ions on wh ich the treaty was based were be ing cha llenged by the first 
recombinant DNA (rONA) experiments . For tr,e firs t t ime tre direct manipu lation of 
the genet ic code was poss ible . Genes could be transferred from one organism to 
another As ::;oon as the results of these firs t experiments were released , concerns 
were VOiced that uncontrolled rONA experimentation cou ld result In the acc idental 
release of a dead ly patr-ogen created in the laboratory Debate over the possible 
hazards led to the strict research guidelines recommended at the As ilomar 
Conference In February, 1975, one month before the BWC entered into effect The 
Nat ional Institutes of Health adopted the guidelines in early 1976. Genetic 
engi!"1eering research in the United States was hampered by tl-,ese gu ide lines until 
1979 whe!"1 the guidell!"1es were eased, al lowing more freedom of experimentat ion 
(Watson. pp. 1-90) Soon after the NIH eased Its gu idel ines, the forefront of rONA 
sh ifted to biotecnnology Industry (Pli ler, p . 184) The f irst product produced by 
rONA. human Insulin , wh ich is produced il1 E. co li oacteria began production 
Application of rONA has allowed the cost-effective product ion of syntr.etic organic 
products . (Watson , p. 465-527) 
W ith the change h the world sit '~ a t i on brought on by the end of the Cold War 
and H'Ie innovations of the biotechnology revolution, is offensive BW now a Viab le 
threat? To answer this question chapter one wi l! evaluate the ut l li ~y of BW In th ree 
scenarios: a tactical battlefie ld scenario where BW use IS sl1nllar to battlefie ld 
chemical wartare; a strategic scenario in which strategic de livery vehicles are used 
to attack rea' areas: and a special forces or terrori st scenario In which a small Unit 
c lal1dest inely de livers the BW agent The second chapter wil l exam ine each stage 
In the development of offens ive BW orograms for use in each of the same 
sceni'Jrios Chaoter three will examine th e decis ion to use biolog ica l and chemical 
weapons and what can be done to deter that deciS ion 
II. IS THERE A BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT? 
This chapter will evaluate the utili ty of BW in three scenarios: a tact ica l 
battlefield scenario where BW is sim ilar to battl efield chemica l warfa re; a slrateg ic 
scenario in which strategic delivery veh icles are used to attack rear areas; and a 
special forces or terrorist scenario in which a small unit clandestinely de livers the 
BWagent. Each of the use scenarios wi ll examine the effect on the armed forces 
or population of a deve loped nation such as the United States and those of a less 
developed nation 
A. TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD SCENARIO 
Under this scenario, BW would be used in a tactical battlefie ld applicat ion 
similar to tactical battlefield use of chemical warfare This scenario wi ll consider the 
direct effects of the pathogen on the troops as well as the loss of combat 
effectiveness caused by protective measures and increased logistics requirements 
for tne defending forces 
1. Desert Storm 
Historica ll y, epidemics of infectious disease have c la imed far more lives 
during wars than C8mbat casua lties (Heggers, pp 390-394) During Desert Storm 
Allied Fcrces faced the poss ibility that Saddarn Hussein 's forces would use 
bio log ,ca l weAporls aga inst them. Desp ile crash programs to produce anthrAx 
vAccine, nol al l troops were ful ly vaccinated ,J ProphylactiC vaccination requires the 
foreknowledge of which agent wi ll be used, Some vaccines only prov ide immun ity 
for a limited time period or require a period of time before fu ll immun ity is conferred 
Through genetic engi:1eering, the agent can be altered rendering standard vaccines 
use lGss . (Pi ller, pp 97, 116, 120) 
If Iraq had used biologica l weapons, All ied Forces wou ld have been 
forced to don protective geAr The United States Army estimates that the donn ing 
of chemical btological warfare (CBW) protect ive gear wou~d caU5e an Immediate 
fifty percent 105S in combat effectiverless to US forces , with combat effect,veness 
continu ing to r8pialy decre8se Ihe longer Ihe gear is worn Th's effect is 
exacerbaied by hot or humid weather (Spiers, p. 67) Properly prepared forces 
couid IAund"', a BW attack without having to don prolectlve gear and exploit the loss 
of combat effect iveness imposed on the opposing forces , (Spiers, p 67) US 
ground forces In Saudi Arabia carried a limited supply of gas mask filler can isters 
and had on ly a one day supply of sea led water The need to decontamir>ate 
equ ipment and resuppiy units With protective gear and water would have seriously 
510wed the advance of Allied Forces (Author's conversations with Gulf War ground 
force veterans) 
NOlle 
(pu rse ,)1 
B. STRATEGIC SCENARIO 
This scenano wil l examine tne use of strateg ic delivery of bio logical weapons 
against rear areas Combat aircraft . ballistic or cruise miss iles are not requ ired for 
the strateg ic del ivery of biolog ical weapons . For a su rprise attack prior to :he 
outbreak of hostilities, time and the ability to penetrate defenses are not a factor 
St rategic b io logica l weapons could be del ivered in militari ly signi fi cant quantit ies 
by a c ivi lian aircraft, ship, submari ne or trllck . (U.s Congress pp. 197,20 1) If the 
area attacked were a key transporta ti on. command and control or logist ics center, 
mob ili zati on and resupp ly could be seriously disrupted and therefore affect the 
outcome on the batttefieid (Sp ires, pp 131, DIA, 60-62) 
Tnis scenario will use the outbreak of d isease du ri ng a large scale natural 
disaster as a model for the use of biological weapons during the disrupt ion caused 
by an ongoing confl ict . In a large country, natural disasters such as hurricanes, 
floods and earthquakes are confined to a small port ion of the tota l area. Res idents 
of small countries are not as lucky In 1988 seve re flood ing submerged over two 
tn irds of Bangladesh. (Kristof, "The Everyday ,. p. A-1) In large nat ions, wltn 
developed infrastructure, emergency supplies and relief workers can qu ickly be 
brought from unaffected areas into the disaster zone. In developing nat ions with 
poor communicat ion, a re lat ively minor illness may result in death because of the 
tlrT'e required to reaCh medica, treatment (Brooke. p. IV-3) 
1. Valley Fever in California 
The J."lnuary 1994 Nonhridge e."lrthauake caused an outbreak of Valley 
Fever (Coccid ioidomycosIs), a flu-like il lness caused by inha lation of a fu ngus 
(Coccidioides immitls) living in tho soil. The earthquake and cloanuo efforts created 
large clouds of dust which conta ined Hle fungus spores One-third of those who 
inhale the spores contract Valley Fever. The infection IS treatable with anli- fungal 
drugs. (Ayers, p. A-21) The disease has an incubation period of several weeks and 
a one percent mortality ra te among victims who receive treatment and ur 10 50 
percent for untreated cases, Peop ~e of Afri can descent are up to 10 times more 
susceptible to Valloy Fever than are Caucasians (Pil ler, pp. 100,245) A 1992 
outbreak affected 4.000 and k illed 34 peop le in Kern County Ca lifornia (Arax, p 
A-1) Va lley Fever was one of the pathogens Invest igated by the Navai Bio logica! 
Laboratory at t~ le Univers ity of Ca lifornia, Berke ley during the 1950's and 1960"s 
(Cookson, p 82) The US. Navy conducted BW tests using a fungal simu lant 
(Aspergil lus fumigatlJs) for Valley Fever at the MechanicsblJrg , Pennsylvan ia supply 
depot in 1951 The Mechanicsburg depot was chosen for the test because the 
Incapacitat ion of the African AMencan workers, WhD compri sed a high percentage 
of ttle employees , would have caused a serious disrupt ion of the Navy supply 
system. (Pli ler p 100) 
2. Cholera in Bangladesh 
Every year In Bangladesh 870.000 ch ild ren under the age 01 l ive die 
One-th ird of Ihose Geaths arc caused by simple d iarrhea (Kr istof, "In 8angladesfl 
" p. A-1) The annual f looding season brings an outbreak of endemic Cholera 
(Brooke, p. IV-3 ) 
Cho le ra is water-borne disease caused by a bacteria (Vibrio comma) 
(Pil ler, p 244). The symptoms, which can begin within a few hours of infect ion, are 
a high fever, vomiting and diarrhea resulting in critical dehydration, Cholera is 
treated by intravenous rehydration and antibiotics . (Brooke, p, IV-3) The morta lity 
ra te for untreated victims is as h igh as 80 percent. (Bailey "Doomsday Weapons 
" p 83) Cholera was one of the fi rst pathogens considered for possible BW use 
The Japanese are alleged to have used it to contaminate wel ls in Manchuria during 
World War II (Piller, p, 35 , Cookson, p, 56) 
The cyclone Which struck Bangladesh in 1991 kil led 139,000 peop le 
Cholera, spread by sewage contaminated water, killed thousands more In coastal 
areas where al l of the homes were destroyed and half the people kil led by the 
storm. The death toll would have been much higher if 8,000 U.S, troops had not 
been dep loyed to the area for disaster re lief with water purification equ ipment 
(Kri stof. "The Every "IV-3, "In Bangladesh's " p A-1) 
3. Anthrax in Sverdlovsk 
The anthrax bacteria (Bacillus anthracis) IS considered by many to be the 
prototypical BW agent. The anthrax bacteria forms spores wh ich can surv ive 
explosive dissemination. The spores remain viable in the env ironment under 
10 
advers e conditions fo r an inaefinite P8nod 4 Anthrax can be contracted oy skin 
contact with the spores (cutaneous anthrax) , ingestion of contaminated food or 
water (gastric anthrax) or Inhalation (pulmonary anthrax) (p'ller, p 170) Pu lmonary 
anthrax has an Incubation period of one (0 seven days and is 99 percent fatal if not 
treatea (Bai ley, "Doomsday Weapons "p,B3 ) The anU)rax bacteria produces 
a toxin that interferes wi th the transmiss ion 0' nerve impulses result ing in 
resp iratory fa ilure and death, (Geissler, p 162) 
On the morning of April 3, 1979, five 10 ten kilograms of anthrax spores 
were released oy an accident at tt)e Microb iology and Virology I"',st itute laboratory 
in Military Compound 19 located in the Chkalovskiy district of Sverd lovsk , The next 
day people who lived or worked down wind of Mil itary Compound 19 began 10 fi ll 
local hospita ls, Their symptoms included extreme ly high fever and breathing 
difficulty, W ithin a few hours of hospitalization, Victims began to d ie Soon afte r the 
accident Sov iet mil itary and KGB forces secu-ed the area and took over cleanup 
and medica l treatment All medica l records were seized and the Vict ims bodies 
were nol returned 10 fam ilies The Soviets acknowledge 79 civil ian casualt ies wi lh 
64 deaths , Accord ing to Western est imates, total casua lties were as high as 1,000 
dead, The oopulatlon of the Chka lovsklY distnc! were vaccinated for anthrax. An 
area of three to four square mi les was sprayed with dis infectant by a ircraft Tho 
'Antill-ax soares from Brit ish BW World W~r I I on Gru i n~ ld I)!~r.d 
,-el)1alT1ed viable un li l !iJc rccem The environmental 
Rl1 tllmx may use on lerrll()ry Ih~l wi ll cvcmua lly be occup ied by 
(I~iten ll erg 
area in the immediate vicinity of Compound 19 was decontaminated with 
hypoch lorite and the top soil was partial ly removed The extensive decontamination 
efforts inside Compound 19 lasted for five years and included the remova l of plaster 
and equipment and the replacement of entire floors. The two month long 
Sverdlovsk human anthrax outbreak is the worst in Russian history. (Leitenberg, pp 
10-13, White) 
When questioned by the Carter administration at the March. 1980 BWC 
review conference, the Soviets cla imed it was an outbreak of intestinal anthrax 
caused by contaminated meat A more elaborate version of the same story was 
presented at the 8We second review conference in 1986 
In 1988, three representatives of the Soviet and Russian Republ ic 
Ministries of Health gave public presentations of the contaminated meat story at the 
Nat ional Academy of Sciences and two other locat ions in the United States One 
of the three, Vladimir N, Sergiyev, Chief Specia list in Infectious Diseases of the 
Russ ian Republic's Minislry of Health, indicated that he had participated in some 
of the Sverd lovsk autopsies, (Leitenberg, p, 11) Despite the contrary evidence 
presented by the United States, the international community largely accepted the 
Soviet account of the SverdlOVSk incident (Piller, pp 169-171 Barry , p 40, Beg ley 
p 25) 
Starting in March of 1990, after Soviet Pres ident Gorbachev's policy of 
Glasnost allowed some freedolTl of the press, accounts o~ what actual ly happen in 
Sveralovsk began to appear in Soviet newspapers . The articles attributed the 
anthrax outbreak to an accident at the laboratory in Military Compound 19 and 
documented the cleanup efforts Medical personne l who attended to the vict ims or 
preformea me autops ies stated trlat tile outbreak was pu lmonary anthrax 
(Leitenberg , pp 11-12) The dlagnus is of pu lmonary anthrax has been verified by 
a jOint team of Russian and American pathologists. The leam re-examined tissue 
samptes from 42 of the Sverdlovsk victims and determined al l had been infected 
with pulmonary anthrax . (Abramova , pp 2291-2294) 
The Sverdiovs" Incident illustrates lrle effectiveness of a relative ly small 
ooml source release of a BW agent and the leve l of effort required to 
decontaminate after such an attack. It also illustrates the difficulty of proving to tI,e 
internationa l community that a BW incident has occurred when the truth is bemg 
obfuscated by a concerted dismformation campaign 
C, SPECIAL FORCES/TERRORIST SCENARIO 
In a special forces or terrorist scenario, a small unit or indiv idual ciandestinely 
delivers the BW agent. Biological weapons are part icularly well sUited for 
clandestine attack , because un like radiological weapons, BW agents have no 
signature which can be detected by external Inspection The 30 ki iograms of 
anthrax spores co"ta ined in <I nomina l ba llistic miSSile bio logical weapons warhead 
would be mudl easior for a sma ll special forces unit to carry than the 300 kil ogmms 
of sarin in a nomina l CW warhead (fetter, p_ 27) Gettlnq a ml li tar iiy sign ificant 
I ~ 
amount of BW agent through entry customs would be easier than importing 
narcotics. B77W agent could be spread over a large area target wi th mosquito 
abatement spraying equipment mounted on a light truck. A c ity's water supply 
could be contaminated with BWagent The venti lation system for a large office 
building or sports complex could be used to disseminate the agent More peop le 
were injured serious ly enough to require hospitalization by the smoke from the 
resu lt ing fi res than by the bomb blast in the Wor ld Trade Center in 1993. If the 
bombers had used a BW agent instead of a bomb they could have k illed or injured 
a far greater number of people with a lower probability of gett ing caught 
This scenario will use the accidental introduction of an exotic or unknown 
pathogen and subsequent epidemic as a model 
1. 	 Legionnaire's Disease 
During an American Legion convention in Philadelphia in Ju ly, 1976, 181 
people were stricken with a pneumonia like il lness . The outbreak c la imed the lives 
of 39 people (Schmeck, "Scientists Link " p. A-1) After a crash research 
program, the Center for Disease Control (CDC) found the cause to be a previously 
unknown bacterium, Leglonella pneumophila. Legionna ire's disease is spread by 
bacteria contaminated mist from air-condit ion ing system coo lmg towers. (Root-
Bernstein, pp 48-49) The bacteria was found 10 have been the cause of severa l 
previous outbreaks of myster ious pneumonia wh ich had baffled medical experts 
(Sctlmeck, "Experts Think "p A-1) The CDC estimates there are 10,000 to 
11 
50,000 cases cf Legionnaire's disease in the United Slates each year, A 
Sep tember 1991 outbreak closed the Social Security Adm in istrat ion bui lding in 
Richmond California, and the 1,200 employees who process bene'its for 4 5 mi lli on 
peop le were placed on administrative leave (Mathews , p. A-J) 
2. Hanta Virus 
In May, 1991 a mysterious aliment cla imed the lives 0' 11 Nava}o Indians 
on a reservation in the Fcur Corners region CDC invest iga tors Isolated the cause 
as a previous ly unidentif ied strain of Henla V:n ..$ , The Hanle Virus is one of a 
family of viruses which cause hemorrhagic fever Ko rean Hemorrhag ic fever is 
caused by a rodent-borne Virus , which istransm itted by contam inated wate r and 
prima rily affects the kidneys During the Korean War thousands of U S servicemen 
we re str icken with the illness, (Larson, p, A-1, Ge issler , p 22) Un like prev iously 
ident ified Hanta Virus strains , the new infection IS caused by i"ha lation of rodent 
dropp ings , dust contam inated with rodent urine or through direct contact w ith 
infected rodents The virus was orig i'1ally isolated in deer mice, but it has now been 
found In several spec ies of ra ts and mi ce, Victims can on ly be treated for the 
symptoms , there is no cure or vacci nati on ("Hanta Virus .. p C 13) As of 
January, 1994 there have been a tota l of 53 con'irmed cases of Hanta Virus In 15 
states. The disease has a 60 percent mortal ity rate The Infectl orl starts like the 
flu then the lungs begin to fi ll wi~h fluio from leaki ng capil laries and patient literally 
drowrs (Larson, p 1\.1) 
15 
Fortunately, the virus is not transmittable from person to person and has 
a low rate of infection The fam ily of a woman in Kansas who contracted the 
disease from hand ling dead mice tested negative for Hanta Vi rus ant ibod ies, 
proving that they had never been exposed. Hea lth officia ls recommend that all wild 
rodents be considered to be infected with Hanta V irus. The orig ina l Four Corne rs 
outbreak and an October , 1993 case in South F lorida have been attributed to 
unusual increases in the rodent population. The mild 1992-1993 winter in the 
southwest and the devastation wrought by Hurricane Andrew resulted In an 
explosion in the number of rodents. (Larson. p. A-1) 
16 
III. OFFENSIVE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
The development and deployment of an offensive BW capability wou ld follow 
the stages used for the development and deployment of any ordnance (Geissler, 
pp. 87 -88) The eva luation of each stage will inciude 
A description Of tile procedures 
The type of facil:ly requ ired 
The expert ise required 
How biotechnology has faci litated the stage 
An approximation of the cost 
An approximation of the t ime requ ired 
The comparable level of biotech infrastructure and c~pabillty 
Applicab ility to each of the three types of programs evaluated 
A. 	 STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BW OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY 
Offensive BW Decision 
Policy rev iew of oro s and cons of an offensive BW effort and decision 
by goyernment to proceed or continue 
Prerara tion of detailed budgetary estimates tor resei'lrch and 
deve,opment 
Research, Development, and Weaponization 
Voting Of R&D budgets 
17 
Recru itment of R&D personne l 

Organ ization of research facilities 

Selection of projects for re search 

Acquisition of microbia l agent 

Genetic manipulation of agent 

Se lection of research projects for development 

10 Organization of development faci lities 
11 Development of agent manufacturing techn iques 
12 Vaccine development 
13 Protecti ve equipment development 
14 Deve lopment of munit ion s, includmg test and evaluation 
15 Standardization of weapons for poss ible procurement 
Large Scale Production 
16 Preparati on of budgetary est imates for procurement and ma intenance 
17 Voting of procurement and maintenance budgets 
18 Procurement of raw materials 
19 Production 01 agents 
20 Product ion of vacci nes 
21 Prod uction/importat ion 01 protective eq uipment 
22 BulK transport of agents 
23 Bulk. storage of agents 
18 
24 Manufacturp. of mun itions 
25 F!lli ng of munitions with agent (poss ibly included with Item 19) 
26 Storage of f illed munitions 
Deployment and War Plan Integration 
27 Deve lopment and integrat ion of employment doctr ine 
28 Tra in ing of troops in defense procedures 
29 Tra in ing of ind ividual troops In offenSive techn iqu0S 
30 Mass Inoculation of troops/civil ians 
31 Dep loyment of materie l in forward areas 
32 e,e'-c"'''((;8,,,,le ' p 88 US. Congress , 
B. OFFENSIVE BW DECISION 
The dec ision to acquire an offenSive capability wou ld not necessarily ve the 
f irst stop In the process The awe allows defensive BW programs Intent is all that 
separates an offens ive from a defens ive program, partlcular!y in the early stages 
Many of the organ isms considered as possiD le BW agents are endemic to the 
counlr:es which present the highest proliferation concern_ Knowledge ga ined in 
infectious disease medica l research and vaccine development IS direct ly applicable 
to offens ive Dialog ica l we8pons development Th is iatont BW capab ll:ly wi ll on ly 
increase wi th the expans ion of the biotechnology industry (Ge iss ler po . 66-73 
U S Congress) UnGer the terms of the Biod iversIty Convent ion, deve loping nat ions 
are to be given preferential access to biotechnology in exchange for access to their 
b iologica l natural resources Transnat ional co rpo rations are sett ing up 
biotechnology operations In developing countries to avoid the restr ictive regulations 
Imposed over genetic engineering in the United States and Europe . (Munson, pp 
503-505) A program which began as peacefut BW defense or medical research 
could quick ly be diverted by a change in the government or national security 
s ituation 
C. RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND WEAPONIZATION 
BW is a perve rse reversa l of public health. The causal agents are h ighly 
pathogenic bacteria, virus, fungi and rickettsia. BW agents are able to reproduce 
themselves so only a small sample is needed to start a BW program Samp les of 
potent ia l BW agents such as anthrax can be obtained by iso lation from nature or 
through b'ological supply firms like the American Type Culture Collection or from 
the CDC . (Strum. p 88) 
Under current biosafety standards in the Uni ted States and Europe research 
and development projects usmg the human pathogens, conSidered the most likely 
BW agents , are conducted under strict BL3 or BL4 conta inment S Research on 
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plan! or animal specif ic pathogens can be safely conducted under less str ingent 
BL 1 or Bl2 containment (Geiss ler p 96) These b iosafely standards are not 
necessarily fo llowed in less developed countries. If the researchers Involved are 
wi lli ng \0 assume the additiona l risk , even the most deadly pathogens can be 
hand led at lower levels of containment. When the United States d ismant led its 
oHensive BW program, the h ighest level of containment it was uSing at the time is 
only comparab le to a BL2 conta inment faci li ty of today , (Bailey , "Iraq Inspect ions 
"p. 50) During the United Nations disarmament. it was discovered that Iraq was 
conduct ing research on fool and mouth disease under 8 1.2 or BL3 containment 
(Ba iley, "Iraq Inspections " 0 49) The NIH classifies Ihe foot and mouth d isease 
virus as a ciass five patho):Jen requir ing the highest level of contai nment 
Imponation of class five pathogens Into the United State s IS forb idden by law. (U S 
Department of Health, p. 46276)) 
Nat ions or subnatlonal organizations with access to even modest microbiology 
resea rch facilities are no longer lim ited to naturally occurring pathogens 
Biotechnology has made it possible to create superior biological weapons One of 
the ma in ways that BW agents are Improved over nature IS by Increas ing their 
res istance to standard medical treatments Due to the misuse of antibiotics in 
medica l treatment and livestock production , th is process is occurring natura tly 
Drug-reSistant pathogens r,ow present a major threat to world hea lth . Bacteria are 
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able to naturally pass antibiotic res islant genes to bacteria of other stra ins 
Staphylococcus , the bacteria most common ly responsible for post-operative 
infect ions is now res istant to all but the "Iasl-resort" antibiot ic, vancomycin. 
Enterococcus. Ihe third most common cause of post-operative infections is now 
resislant to all antibiotics. Enterococcus may pass its resistance to staphy lococcus 
and other bacteria with deadly results. (Krieger. A-14) Rather than waiting fo r th is 
process to occur naturally rONA technology allows the direct and de liberate 
manipulation of genetic code. A small change in the DNA sequence which contro!s 
the produclion of a virus outer protein coat would render standard vaccines useless 
against the new manmade stra in . (Pli ler, p . 97) 
In an effort to reduce the cost and env ironmenta l impact of chem ica l 
pesticides, insecl pathogens are being used on an experimental basis as biolog ica l 
pest icides Thirty species of Baci llus thring iensis (Bt) , a spore formmg bacteria. 
which produces a protein that destroys msect stomachs , can be applied to crops in 
a powder or liqu id form Genetic engineering research is being conducted to 
shorten the time insect virus and fungi pathogens take to kill. (Howe, "All 'p. 0 ­
5) 
All of the research and development associated with biologica l pes~ icides is 
d irectl y app licab le to a offens ive BW. The research and development cou ld a lso 
be used to obfuscate the eXistence of a BW program. The large sca le test ing of 
b iologica l weapons to simulate use under battlefield cond itions would requ ire an 
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expans ive control led area such as the Dugway proving grounds. (Geissler, pp 102­
103) This activity cou lo be disgu ised as a legitim<lte test of biological pesticide 
(U S, Congress p 102) 
D. LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION 
The b iotechnica l revolution is greatly improv ing the efficiency of prooucing 
organ ic products. Production of a la rge quantity of product used to requi re large 
capacity fermentors producing sing ie batches The technology is now ava ilab le to 
cont lnuousiy produce the same amoun~ of product in a laboratory facil ity (US 
Congress , p 103) Us ing rONA, the genes which produce a des ired protein can 
be inserted 'nto bacteria , yeast or animal cel is ana cult ivated in large vats Prior 
to rDNA technology, product ion of these proteins required the labor intenSIVe 
extraction from large amounts of plant or animal tissue wtlere it occurred naturally 
Sp lici ng the genes directly mto embryon!c plant s and animals can produce the 
same proteins for-one half to one-tenth the cost of production in fermenting vats 
Another production method which does not affect the heredity , and therefore 
bypasses the need for creating a new line of plants, uses the disarmed tobacco 
mosaic retrovirus to In!roduce new genes into tobacco plants. The protein gene is 
sp liced mto the virus and the Virus is dusted or sprayed OntO adu lt plan ts Til e 
~ooacco plant then begins to produce the protein in its leaves, from where it can be 
extracted (Barnum, p. E-1) 
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The modern biomedical facilities used for this type of production are no longer 
unique structures, The biotechnology industry is now growing at a faster rate than 
the electronics industry did at a comparable stage of development. (Wolf, p. 0 -1 ) 
Due to health, safety and purity requi rements, many new facilities for vaccine or 
pharmaceutical production are being constructed with the BL4 containment needed 
for the safe conta inment of the most deadly pathogens, (U.S, Congress, p. 92) 
Although most of the rapid ly expanding biotechnology infrastructure is located in 
indus tr ia tlzed nations, the high cost of labor in Europe and North America IS 
causing labor intensive portions of the biotechnology Industry such as plant tlssue­
culture to relocate to developing nations l ike India . (McDonald , p. 44) 
Modern production facilities and technology with possible BW application are 
not limited to Just BW agent production. The same economic and environmental 
impari ties Which are driving biological pesticide resource and deve lopment have 
caused the raising of beneficial bugs to become big business. Billions of insect 
predators and paraSites are being ra ised in breeding facil ities as a substitute for 
chemical pesticides, The beneficial insect larva are mixed with rice hulls or 
vermiculite and can be sprayed on with a crop duster, (Howe, "Raising " p 0-1) 
The technology used to breed these Insect predators is the modern equivalent to 
that used by the Japanese BW program In China during World War II to produce 
human flea vectors for plague. (Cookson , p.302 Wh ite ) 
Large containment laboratories and modern equipment are not required for 
a biolog ical weapons capabili ty. BW agents can be produced in smal l flasks us ing 
manual methods . "The Iraqi BW program at Salman Pak employed only 10 oeople 
(according to Iraq i cla ims), ut ilized 7 or 8 rooms and had no sophisticated 
equipment " (Bailey, "Iraq Inspections " pp_ 50-51) The production of a biologica l 
agent for use in a terrorist attack is no more difficul t than the product ion of heroin 
(Stern, p. 402 
E. DEPLOYMENT AND WAR PLAN INTEGRATION 
To fu ll y integrate biolog ical weapons into a conventiona l battlefield force 
wou ld requ ire the same effort it wou ld take to integrate CW As an examp le, the 
North Korean Army (KPA) is the world's most prepared to fight in a CAW 
environment The KPA uses weakened chemical agents for major train ing 
exerCises Unlike western NBC t' alning exe~c i ses which last. at most , a few hOurs, 
KPA units spend up to ten days in protect ive gear Un its down to squad level 
receive extensive offenSive CBW tra ining. North Korea (DPRK) produces it' s own 
CBW warheads fer large caliber mortars, rockets. and Frog and Scud variant 
miss il es_ The DPRK has independent ly developed and tesled an offens ive 
biological weapons capability The DPRK has also deve loped self- sufficiency in 
NBC protect ive equipment product ion KPA doct ri ne Includes f ir st use of CW In 
plans fo ~ the liberat ion of the Korean pen insu la (!3ermudez, pp . 226-228) KPA 
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missiles armed with CBW warheads ca n hit targets in all of So uth Korea and now 
threaten parts of Japan. Russia and China. (Ertman. pp_ 612-617) 
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IV. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DETERRING A RATIONAL CHOICE 
of nuclear forces IS to deter the use of weapons of mass 
and to serve as a hedge th e emergence of an 
overwhe lming conventional threat. The for nuclear deterrence IS a 
continuing one whether the nation is at peace or our troops are responding to 
a contingency In some region of th e world. (Nat iona l Mi li ta ry p. 13) 
A. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: A RATIONAL CHOICE? 
Nucl ear, chemica l and bio logical weapons, when cons idered as a group , are 
refe rred to as weapons of mass destruction . Nuclear weapons, wh ich are 
possessed by only a relatively few countri es , have on ly been used in w8'fare twice 
by one countr y_ Chemica l and b:ologlcal weapons are possessed and have Deen 
used by a larger and eve r Increas ing number of countri es. The inherent dual -use 
nature of CBW technology and materia ls, along with their relatively modest cost 
does not present the barrier to acqu isition that obtain ing f issi le matena l and other 
specia lized nuc lear technology does . A ll countnes with eve"] a rud imentary 
biomed ical o r chem ica l industry infra struct ure have a late'"' t Indigenous abi:l ty to 
produce CBW agems The ease of production and modest cost of CBW agents 
doom international counterproliferat ion efforts to stop a determined proli fera tor 
W ith no rel iable way to prevent the acqu:sition of CBW weapons, It IS 
Incumbem upon the Un ited States and the mternational community to deter the ir 
first use T~e fi rst step in deterring tile use of CBW is understand ing why st ates 
choose to break Internat iona l law ane employ banned weapons Once ihe 
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dynamics of the use decis ion are understood, deterren t strategies can be 
developed to influence that decision 
1. International Agreements 
The codif ication of th e laws of war into binding mternat ional agreements 
began in the second half of the nineteenth century. Since that time there have 
been numerous attempts to outlaw specific weapons on human it arian grounds 
Most of these efforts failed to reach the inte rnat ional consensus requi red for their 
incorporati on into a binding regime Al l of the internat ional agreements wh ich have 
been reached have u ltimately fai led 
a. Explosive Projectiles 
The 1868 St Petersburg Declaration was the first modern attempt 
to ban the use of a specific weapon in warfare. The Declaration banned the use In 
war of explos ive or incend iary prOjectiles weighing less than 400 grams (14 oz) 
Although the Declaration only applied to war between the states pa rty to the 
Declaration. it established the international legal precedent that weapons which 
cause need less suffering are against th e laws of humanity . (A Roberts. pp 30-31) 
Technica ll y, the Declarat ion stil l remai ns in effect In practice , the Declarat ion 
a long With most othe r pre-1914 agreements . did not survive World W;:Jr 
Wor ld War I was the first t ime that hand grenades were used 
extensively The t;end In gren;:Jde development has been to reduce size and 
I 
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weight. The sma ller grenades al low the sold ier to carry more and throw farther 6 
Most thrown or rifle projected grenades weigh less than 400 g_ (Lumsden, pp_126­
135, 212, 220) 
b, Dumdum Bullets 
The use of dumdum bullets in war was out lawed by the 1899 Hague 
Dec laration which was the f irst cod if icat ion of the laws of land warfare The 
dumdum bu llet, which is a sem i-jacketed bul let wIth a 1 mm soft point , gets it's 
name from the British Dumdum Arsenal near Ca lcutta , India where It was f irst 
produced Dumdum bu llets expand or f latten in the human body caus inQ a larger 
wound than a simil ar fu lly Jacketed bullet. (Lumsden, pp . 213-214) The British 
argued tnat the increased stopping power of the dumdum was needed when fight ing 
against savage races such as the tr ibesman of Nonhwest India . (Best , p 162) The 
United States objected to the declaration on the grounds thaI, a lthough its specif ic 
languaQe outlawed one type of bu llet, there we re other methods by wh ich a bu ll et 
could be made Ihat had i den~ i cat effects (Lumsden pp_21;1-215) Although the 
proh ibition aga inst non-fu ll metal jacket ammunition rema ins in force,' the sp irit of 
the declaration has been overtaken by technology as predicted in the American 
objection. Modern mi litary rif les use smal l, high ve locity spri tzer (po inted) bu llets 
(Cffective Ih row d ista nce A 250 g grena:Je ca r. be tllro'Wn 
~pp ,o\ i m<:te l y ,10 mel ers wil l, only 
"United StJtes am;eo forces ot Mmed c0nfl iCI 5reci f,c ~l l y pro hibit., ~ I le'-'Jlg 
~mmunll'on 10 [JIitKc d' j IllOU[JI bu ltets. (Nav~[ p. 19) 
which tend to tumble after entering the human body producing an effect similar to 
the dumdum, Moreover, the use of smaller bullets allows the individual soldier to 
carry more rounds. (Lumsden, pp 55-56) 
c. Chemical and Biological Weapons 
The first international agreement to codify the customary prohibition 
against using poison in warfare was the 1899 Hague Declaration II. The Dec aration 
banned the use of poison gas projectiles, (Besl. p 160) The specific prohibition 
againsl pOison gas projectiles was broadened in the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
Annex Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. Article 22 
states that "The right of belligerent to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited." Article 23 states, in part, that "in addition to the prohibitions provided 
by specla Conventions, It is especially forbidden (a) To employ poison or poisoned 
weapons: (b) To kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile 
nation or army; (e) To employ arms. projectiles or material catculated 10 cause 
unnecessary suffering" (A. Roberts, p. 52) The 1907 Hague Convention IV was 
recognized as a declaration of customary international law by the International 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and, as such, they remain in effect (A. Roberts, P 
44) 
(1) World War I. Contrary to the predictions of a quick victory by 
most military planners, :he western front of World War I degenera'.ed into 
inconclusive trench wariarp. To hreak the stalp.matp., both Sides be,:larl 
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expe rimenting with pOison gas The French were the fi rst to use gas in combat 
They used tear gas in smal l quantit ies in 19 14 without effect. The f irs t major gas 
attack was on Aori l 22, 1915 at Ypres. The Germans used 6000 cyl inders 
conta ining 165 tons of chlorine along a front of SIX to seven kilometers. German 
tactica l mistakes and lack of ready reserves prevented them from a major 
exp lo itat ion of the surprise attack, (Sp iers , pp. 69-7<1) 
The mill ions of tons of chemical agent used in World War I d id not break the 
stalemate The use of gas resul ted in over one mi llion casua ties and over 90 
thousand deaths. These numbers seem large except when compared with th e tota l 
carnage which the wa r brought about. Only 5,7% of the total casualties and 1.4% 
of the combat deaths were the resu lt of chemica l warfare (Cookson, pp 283-286) 
(2) 1925 Geneva Pro/oco/. The fa ilure of the Hague Agreements 
and the massive use of cllemlcai weapons led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The 
Protoco l banned the use in war of asphyxi at ing , po isonous or oUler gases , all 
ana logous liqUids and bacteriolog ica l meUlods of warfare (A Rober1 s, pp 137 -145) 
The proh ibition was not violated by the par1les to the Protocol during World War liB 
and has on ly been violated on a relatively few occas ions given the several hundred 
nternat iona l conflicts which have occurred since it came into force (E li sa Harris 
"Flaws in the Proposed ICWA" in Jensen, p 28) W hy al l other internationa l 
whic h used bot h hiolo~ l cal Jlld chemical weaporlg tlu rlllg World War I I, signed the 
P, o tOC(i 111 bUI did rl ot becoille a :Jany unti l I (no 
agreements outlawing specific weapons have fa iled and violations of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol remain except iona l IS the subject of much Intellectuat debate. The 
exptanatory arguments can be broken down into six categories. The categories are 
internationat law, domestic polit ical. horrors of war, re ta li at ion in ki nd, mil itary utili ty 
and rat ionat choice . 
2. International Law 
The international law theory holds that state s have been con stramed 
from usmg CBW by the Geneva Protocol and the international consequences for 
v iolat ing an accepted norm of state behav ior, This theory fa il s as an explanation 
on two accounts First , on the three occasions when undisputed use of chemica l 
weapons came to the attention of the internat iona l community while the vio lat ion 
was ongoing, the transg ressor was a pa rty to the Protocol. Du ring th e 1935-36 
lIa lo-Ethiopian War, Hai le Selassle. Emperor of Ethiopia. described the Ita lian use 
of mustard gas in hi s speech before the league of Nati ons. His was the on ly 
appearance before the Assembly of the league of Nations by a head of state The 
League took no action against Italy for violati ng the Protocot Soon after the 
Emperor' s appearance the ineffect ive sanct ions p laced on Italy after the invas ion 
were canceled, granting defacto recognition of It ali an domination of Ethiopia 
(Ba rker, pp 294-297) The lack of action by the mternat ional community is not 
unique to the league of Nations. The United Nat ions took no act ion aga inst Egypt 
for using Soviet supp lied chemica l weapons against Yemen in the 1960's (Cookson 
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pp 6-14), or against Iraq for chemical attacks on Iran . (Spiers, pp. 121 -125) 
Secondly , the Soviet or their clients Li se of chem ica l or toxic weapons in Southeast 
ASia and Afghan istan was never considered by the Security Council due to the Co ld 
War sta lemate In the UN, (Sp iers, pp . 113-11 7 and White) 
As the conflict in Bosnia shows, the international commun ity is even less 
potent in mitigating non-international conflict. The United Nations Charter prevents 
it from interfering in the Internal affairs of sovereign nations (UN Charter Article 2 
7) 
3. 	 Domestic Po litical 
The domest'c po!itical theory holds that a state is constrained from us ing 
CBW by it's population's aversion to using CBW ThiS theory does not account for 
the non-use of CBW by nations whose governments have little no accountability to 
their popu lation In the case of Ita ly's use of mustard gas in Ethiop ia a pamphlet 
proclaiming the intent ion to use chemical warfare was distnbuted to the troops and 
their famil ies to overcome the apprehension caused by memories of fut ile attacks 
during World War I (Barker, p 124) 
By the sum~er of 1945 , with the war in Europe over and the POSSibi lity 
of a protracted bloody conflict dragg ing on in the PaC if ic, America was rethinking 
i\'$ position on CBW The mounting casualt ies of the 1$land CaMpa igns prompted 
some newspapers to call for the use of gas against the Japanese Publ ic op inion 
W8S sh ifting In favor of US ing gas to save American lives. Had the atom ic bomb not 
been dropped and the war ended, the American public's aversion to CBW may have 
evaporated, (van Courtland Moon, "Project SPHINX pp.303-307) 
During the Vietnam War, the Un ited States and South Vietnam used 
large amounts of riot control agents (CS) and herbicides. The lJse of CS gas and 
Agent Orange caused considerable domestic controversy, but tha t did not prevent 
their use "As early as 1964 the Federation of American Scientists condemned the 
use of herbicides in Vietnam as exercises in field-testing for chem ical and biological 
warfare" (Sp ierS, p 111) The United States took the minority posit ion that non­
letha l riot control agents and herb icides were not covered by the Geneva Protocol 
and continued use unt il late in the war 9 (Lumsden, p. 259 Naughton, "Nixo'l 
Widens .. p. 1) 
Subnational organizations must have the support of their cons~ituency 
just as a state needs the support of its c it izens Some organization's actions are 
tightly constrained while others are rela tively autonomous The acceptable leve l 
of violence in any given intrastate conflict is a complex dependant variab le based 
on the interaction of the government, society and the subnational organization 
(Leites , pp. 48-70) An allegation like the one that the DEA is respons ib le for the 
outbreak of cocoa fungus In Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley (Schmidt-lynch, p A-B) 
1925 Geneva Protocol urltil 19 75 and so lVas 
I'hc 1993 COTlvcmion on the Prohibition of the 
of Chemica l \Veapon, And on Thcir Destruction 
agcnt~ as a method of warfare ((we, Artic le 
to domestic po li lica l pressure. endec11he use of Agent Orange in 
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or Iraq's gassing of its Kurdish minority may raise the acceptable level of violence 
to include Caw. (leites, pp.90-132 Stern , p, 403) 
4. Horrors of War 
The horrors of war theory holds that CBW weapons cause such horr ib le 
effects that institutions and decision makers have an avers ion to their use 
Proponents of th is theory most often point to the non-use of caw during the 
European portion of World War II. The theory fai ls to account for the Brit ish use of 
chemica, weapons aga inst the Red Army during the Al li ed Intervent ion in the 
Russian Civil War or the Ital ian use In Eth iop ia after they had experienced it's 
horrors on the World War I western front (Sp iers , 83-84) 
The World War I chemica l experience that shaped western perceptions of 
caw has not been shared by most of the rest of the world Cu ltural d ifferences 
cause differences in attitude towards CAW, (Charles C Flowerree "Current 
Chemica l Weapons Proliferat ion" In Findlay pp , 13-1 4) European powers had no 
qualms about Infl ict ing mass casualt ies on indigenous popu la tions With 
conventional arms dUring the colonia l wars At the Batt le of Qmdurman during the 
Brit ish subjugation of the Sudan, there were over 11,000 Dervish kil led compared 
to only 48 Brit ish casualties, The "victory" was ascrioec to British spirit and the 
superiority of the wh ite 'TIan, not the six M8x irn gum; that d id the ~(' I l i ng (E llis, p R5­
87) "It is not unreasonable to suppose that many people of the Third World see 
dying by chem ical weapons as more or less preferable than perishing by bu llets or 
flame" (Charles C. Flowerree "Current Chemical Weapons Proliferation" in Find iay 
pp . 14-15) 
5. Retaliation in Kind 
The reta li at ion in k ind theory ho lds that states wil l not employ CBW 
against an enemy which also has a CBW capabi lity . This theory, whi le exp lain ing 
the non-use of CBW in Europe and the Japanese use only against the Chinese 
dur ing World War 1I, (Spires , pp . 88-94, White) does not account for Iraq's 
cont inued use of chemical weapons after Iran acqu ired its own chemica l capabili ty 
The majori ty of the chemica l casua lties occurred in 1986-87, by which time the 
Iranians were also us ing chemica l weapons extenS ive ly . (Elisa Harris in Jensen, p 
31 Waters. p 61, White) 
The theory also does not hold for a non-state attacker A subnatianai or 
transnationa l argan ization may no! control any terr itory which can be the target of 
Iranian Chemical Casualties 
a cow retaliation . The organization mayor may not have a state spansor who can 
p rov ide the weapon A tlosl ile state could carry out a CBW attack th rou gh a 
subnatlona l organ izat ion without being imp licated and subject to retaliation 
(Arcu illa , p 19) 
6. Military Utility 
The mili tary ulility theory holds thai the use of CBW is limited to a narrow 
set of circumstances by its limited effectiveness and difficulty of use 
a. Battlefield Utility 
Since World War I, CBW has not been used aga inst troops who 
were fully prepa red CBW is most effective aga inst poorly equipped and trained 
troops or unprotected targets such as civi lian populations . (Ju lian P Rob inson 
"Chemica l Weapons Proliferation : The Probtem in Perspective" in Find lay, p 28) 
The Italians effectively used mustard gas as a force multiplier against the barefoot 
Eth iop ians The spraymg of mountainsides compensated for the lack of Italian 
mountain tra in ing and sealed of the flanks of advancing Ita li an columns , (Baker, p 
242 ) The use of gas as a terror weapon hastened the dissolution of the h igh ly 
mot ivated but poorly equipped Ethiop ian forces. (Dugan, p 247 ) In the Iranllraq 
War, Iraq used chem ical weapons to blunt the human wave attacks by the high ly 
motivated but poorly equipped Iranian "martyrs" Iraq i conventional forces were 
able to repel the attacks in the open desert but needed chemical weapons in the 
marshlands and mountains 
If mi litary util ity were the only consideration. all CBW capabte forces who 
were be ing ove rwhelmed by masses of poorly equipped light forces in difficult 
terrain would use CBW 10 blunt the attack . American forces in Ko rea faced th is 
si tuat ion when the Chinese entered the Korean war The Peoples Liberation Army 
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(PLA) axis of attack was down the Korean central mountain range. Contrary to 
pODular be lief, the PLA did not mass attack American forces on a wide front, 
human wave tactics were used by a success ion of platoon or company sized units 
to attack key tactical posi ti ons, (George, PP 1-5) American forces could have used 
caw with devastating effects and ended the Chinese advance we ll north of the 
thirty-eighth para llel 
b, Strategic Utifity 
Numerous develop ing countri es possess or are acquiring first 
generation ba ll ist ic miSSiles These missiles , based on the Wor ld War II German 
V-2, typically have a payload of 500 to 1000 kg, a range of less than 1000 km and 
a CEP of 1000 meters These missiles, armed with convent iona l high explos ive 
warheads, are not a sign ificant mit itary threat unless they are used in large 
numbers, The 2000 V-2 f ired at Britai n during World War II only caused i ,500 
deaths (U ,S, Congress pp, 203-222) These same miss il es equ ipped with CBW 
wa rh eads can have a much greater effect 
Sad dam Hussein's threat to use chem ical warfare aga inst Israe l 
durmg the Gu lf War resulted in a mass ive c ivi l defense effort, Gas masks and 
nerve gas antidotes were distributed , fami lies were Instructed to create sea led 
rooms and stockpile food and water During the 18 actual scud miss ile attacks and 
several fa lse alarms, the ent ire Israeli popu lat ion was ordered into the sea led rooms 
and to don their gas masks Although none of the scuds carri ed a chem ical 
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warhead and caused no appreciable material damage, the disruption of normal 
acti vity resu lted in billions of do lla rs of economic loss. The stress from the scud 
attacks and protective measures also resulted in numerous heart attacks and other 
short and long-term psychologica l casual ties. (Ste inberg, pp. 90-95) 
The effectiveness of a CBW warhead is dependant upon the size of 
dlsim inated part ic les, weather conditions, defensive measures, leatha lty and 
population densi ty (Spiers pp . 9-11. 145 -1 46) 
The larger the parlicle size. the faster they wil l fa llout of the air 
Large particles wil l result in a heavy concentration ove r a smal l area This woulo 
be usefu l for contaminating an area target such as an air f ie ld using a persistent 
agent Part icles smaller than 5 microns remain a irborne longer and are more 
readi ly absorbed by the respatory system. (Cookson, p. 267) 
The disimination and lethal ity of CBW agents are affected by 
temperature, humidity, sunl ight, and wind speed Temperature, humidity and 
intensity of u ltraviolet light ali affect the rate of caw agent decompos ition . High 
wind speeds wil l spread the agent too quickly Optimum cond itions for a caw 
attack are a calm clea r night. (Cookson, p. 268) 
The letha l effects of CBW agents are dependant on the amount of 
agent absorbed . Relatively high concentrations of chemica l agents are required to 
cause death or mcapacita! ionn (Cookson. p 199, Spiers, p 9) A single 
microorganism ca~, cause Injection lead ing to death, Larger amounts are required 
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to overcome partial Immunity and decrease the time between exposure and effect 
A letha l dose of oacillus anthracis is 1000 times sma ller than that for a nerve agent 
(Fetter, p . 24) 
Civi l defense measures like those used by Israel will not be 100% 
effect ive According to US. Army estimates, casua lties among fu lly tra ined combat 
troops will still be four to e ight percent 01 unprotected troop casua lties d~e 10 
delayed or improper masking , missing or defective equipment, and early 
unmasking . Casualty rates among c ivili ans wil l be at least 10 percent. (Fetter, p 
26-27) Large-scale vaccination programs aga inst BW requ ire defenders to know 
wh ich BW agent would be used in a attack wel l In advance of host ili t ies , The 
vaccine needs to be deve loped , manufactured, distributed and adm inistered In 
sufficient time to confer Immunity on the populat ion This amount of warn ing wou ld 
not normally be available In the event of attack, the high number of vict ims would 
overwhelm the capacity of the med ical system, (P iller, PP 102-103) 
1 1 
A comparison 01 casua lties produced by con~e"tional. chemical. bio l ogic~1 and nuclear b~llistic 
miss ile warheads In an attack on ~ westprn <:ity .'o (Fetter , p.27) 
Type of 
Defenses 
Inju red Injured 
COllvenlional" 
Chemical " 200·3,000 200·3.000 
Riological " 20·80 ,0 00 20·80,000 
Nllclear" 40,000 40,000 20,000 20,000 
The population density of cities in the developing world is 10 to 30 
times higher than that of developed nations. A bal li st ic missi le attack on Ca iro 
wou ld c la im 10 t imes the casua lt ies as an attack on a western city, (Fetter, pp 22 
27) A 20 ~lloto n nuclear warhead would cause approx imate ly 10,000 times the 
amount of death and Injury as a 1000 kg HE warhead, 10 to 100 times as much as 
a chem ical warhead and the same number of casualties as a biological warhead 
against an unprotected popu lation under the optimum conditions . (Fetter. p 27) 
"'ASSllllle ~ ~ missile with a 
per lleclare 
bva of twO ana caSIl ~llit5 from ellW by J factor often 
11 1,000 ki lograms high exp losive 
"300 kilogl'lllllS of sarin 
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Covert Utility 
CAW offers greater mil itary utili ty to a subnational organization or 
special forces unit than It does to the conventional mili tary Special forces un its 
could conduct clandestine attacks us ing CBW against key targets before or during 
a conflict. These attacks could impede mobilization and reinforcement , and disrupt 
operations at airfields (Spires , p. 130) A CBW attack in an enclosed area such as 
a sports stadium or large office building wou ld not be as affected by environmenta l 
factors as an open air attack. (Root-Bernstein, p. 48) The mere threat of CBW use 
can have devastating effects A reported poisoning of Chi lean grapes resulted In 
the loss of $333 mi ll ion dollars. A leftwing organization claimed to have poisoned 
the fruit, but only two grapes were found with a non letha l trace of cyanide (Stern, 
pp 395-396) A CBW attack could be as Simple as contaminat ing a water supply 
with fecal matter (Root-Bernstein, p_ 48) 
7. Rational Choice 
The rational choice theory holds that the decision on use of CBW is 
based on an ana lysis of all the cost and benefits. The American non -u se of CBW 
In Korea is the best example of thi s theory , CBW wou ld have been highly effective 
ag,ginst the PLA, but the domestic and internationa l cost of use outwe ighed the 
mil itary uti !lty 
The rat ional chO ice model accOLints for cultura l and perceptual 
differences If use of CBW would have adverse domest ic po lit lca, consequences 
those must be tRken mto account by the decision maker 
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Since World War I no military forces well equipped with protective gear 
have been subject to chemica l attack. This precedent may not hold in a poss ible 
future conf li ct in Korea . The North Korean Army (KPA) is the world's most 
prepa red to fight in a CBW environment. CBW could be used to exp loit the 
fOlWard-deployed position of ROK and US, forces. Nonpersistent agents could be 
used in ground force breakthroughs of defensive positions and to b lunt 
counterattacks. Persistent agents cou ld be used against fixed strategic targets 
such as command and controt centers. toglstic depots and airfields (DIA, pp 60-62) 
The early coordinated and judicious use of CBW has a high probabil ity of shifting 
the tactica l balance of forces in Korea in the North's favor, a llowing the KPA to 
make sUbstantial gains before U,S. reinforcements could arrive, If the current cris Is 
in Korea results in confl ict , it would be rational for North Korea to use caw as a 
force multiplier to aid in ovelWhelming the ROK and deployed U,S forces , (Arquil la, 
pp. 17-20) 
S, DETERRING THE RATIONAL CHOICE 
What makes atom ic weapons different is a powerful tradition that they are 
different The reason we do not ban bows and arrows on the grounds that they 
too, like nuclear weapons, kill and maim people, IS that there IS a tradit ion for 
the use of bows and arrows, a jOintly recognized expectation that they Wll i be 
used if it IS expedient to use them. There is no such tradition for the use of 
atomic weapons there IS instead a tradition for their nonuse, (Sche ll ing, p 
250) 
Unfortunately, as discussed in the above, there is no tradition of nonuse of 
caw They have been used whenever It has appeared that the benefits of their 
use outweighed !he cost The deterrence of future first use of eBW wil l requ ire 
international and national action to readjust the costlbenefit equatiotl and establi sh 
a tradition of nonuse. There are two ways this can be done deterrence by denia l 
and deterrence by punishment 
1. Deterrence By Denial 
Under deterrence by denia l, a potentia l user of CBW wou ld be 
forewarned that no advantage could be achieved through use (Levine , p . 9) A! the 
mternat iona l level a col lect ive security consensus must be reached that expiic it ly 
guarantees that a mu lti lateral force w il l come to the aid of a v ict im of a eBW attacK 
(Bailey , Noncompliance p 14) This consensus wou ld reverse the p recedent of 
international inaction On the national level, increased battlefie ld and c iv il defense 
programs wou ld lower the margina l ut ilit y of eBW use (Fetter, p, 37-40) 
2. Deterrence By Punishment 
Deterrence by pun ishment requires an exp licit threat that the use of 
CBW would incite a retaliatory response wh ich wou ld outweigh the potential 
benefits The United States uni latera lly gave up the oat ion of reta liation in kind to 
biologica l and tox ic weapons in 1969 and 1970 respective ly (Naughton, "Ni xon 
Widens 'p i) The ewe wh ich the United States signed when it opened for 
s ignature :n .Ianuary 1993, out laws the development producl ion , DOSsession 
transfer and use of chemica l weapons under any circumstances The convention 
also mandates the destruction of any eXisting weapons within ten years , (eWe, Art 
I) Having given up the right to retaliate to CBW in kind, the policy of the United 
States, as stated in the National Mili tary Doctri ne is to deter the use of nuclear, 
biological and chemical weapons with nuclear weapons_ Th is position has been 
made more untenable by the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons. Deterrence 
of a ll use of weapons of mass distruction (WMD) is now based on the strateg ic 
nuclear forces, which suited for the 
The United States has three options to deter the use of CBW against its 
interests: the current policy based on the threat of reta liat ion With strategic nuclea r 
weapons; Withdrawal of U S forces, ignoring the use of CBW; and, the 
development of a balanced, coherent, general extended deterrence policy based 
on robust conventional and nuclear capabil ity. (Cropsey , p_ 14) 
Once the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States, 
deterrence was based ultimately on the threat of assured destruct ion Now that the 
threat of nuctear Armageddon has been eased, the United states should not return 
to the policy of massive nuclear re ta liation . The Clinton Administration has listed 
Cuba, North Korea , Iran and Iraq as recalcitrant outlaw "backlash" states_ (lake. p 
45) 
These backlash states have some common characteristics . Ruled by 
cliques that control power through coercion, they suppress basic human rights 
and promote ra dica l Ideo logies While their pol itical systems vary, their 
leaders share a common ant ipathy toward popular part icipati on that might 
undermine the existing regimes These nations exhibit a ch ronic Inabili ty to 
engage construct ive ly wi th the out side and they do not function 
effectively in a lliances--even with those They are often on the 
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defensive, increasingly crit icized and targeted with sanct ions in internat ional 
forums 
Fina lly , they share a siege mentality . Accordingly, they are embarked on 
ambit ious and costly military programs--especial ly in weapons of mass 
destruct ion (WMD) and missile delivery systems--in a misguided quest for a 
great equalizer to protect their reg imes or advance their purposes aoroad 
(Lake, p. 46) 
Strategic nuclear weapons are a poor deterrent of the regimes which are 
now acquiring WMD capability for three reasons. (Cropsey. p 15) First, IS the 
United State's unwil lingness to use nuclear weapons under the most likely of WMD 
use scenarios. The current deterrence policy of un ilaterally assured destruction 
does not differer t late between a strateg ic, tactical or non -conventiona l WMD use 
A CBW attack. on US troops or Interests would necessitate a retal iatory response 
us ing h ign yield strategic nuclear weapons Even if the response was lim ited to one 
or two weapons, it would result in the mass casuali ties among the civil ian 
Dopulatlon (Dowler, pp. 35-36) This policy IS particularly unjust if iable in light of the 
fact that the teaders of the most wO((lsome prol iferant states are not controlled by 
thei r population. Secondly. the leaders of proli ferant states may have a different 
cost benefit analys Is and not be deterred by the holding of civ ilian population at 
risk Third ly, United States nuclear reta liation for a CBW attack wou ld undermine 
nuc lear pronlbition and subvert ant i-nuclear goals . (Cropsey, p 15) 
The Un l!ed States faces the nuclear deterrence d il emma that nuclear 
weapons are only a deterrence If they are never usee! If the nuclear weapons wi ll 
never bf! used, they are not a credible deterrent (Guertner, p 147) 
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These weaknesses of the current policy can be overcome with a 
balanced, coherent, general, extended deterrence policy based on a robust nuclear 
and conventional capability, During Desert Storm the United States demonstrated 
that technological improvements in conventional weapons range, accuracy, 
survivability and lethality allow them to be used aga inst strategic targets 
Conventional weapons can be used against counterforce, economic, and non­
hardened command and control targets which could previously only be targeted 
with nuclear weapons (Guertner, pp, 142-143) 
A credible conventional threat to supporting infrastructure like that 
attacked during Desert Storm, backed up by a strategic nuclear force, may be more 
of a deterrent than a dubious threat of strategic nuclear attack on a population, Use 
of CBW will result in guaranteed U S conventional response which infl icts more 
pain than any possible benefits , (Cropsey , p, 15) This attack could be carried out 




W ith the end of the Co ld War , the most likely scenarios for confli ct do not 
Include the clash of mass tank arm ies on the central European p lain. The end of 
the bipolar compet it ion has released the pressures of ethnic and rel ig ious r iva lry 
As demonstrated by the World Trade Center bombing , the United States is not 
immune to the consequences of these new conflicts . The biotechnical revolution 
is simplifying some of the problems which were considered insurmountable in 1969 
when the US, gave up offens ive biological warfare As biotechno logy d isseminates 
through the world, a nation or subnationa l organization may use biological weapons 
as "the poor man's atom bomb" 
The international agreements to outlaw such weapons on humanitarian 
grounds have been honored mostly in their breach because the benefits of violation 
oulweighed the consequences , In the case of CBW agents, thei r limited use has 
not been the result of any single factor Close exam ination of the facts reveals that 
CBW has been used when a ra tional analysis determi'1ed that the benefits 
outwe ighed the cosls, This cost/benefits analySIS IS not a universal ledger. Each 
deCision maker has a unique set of factors to evaluate. The current United States 
WMD dete rrent po licy IS based on the threat of re!a llatlon wiHI strategic nuclear 
weapons This policy fa ils to address the limitations on the use of nuclear weapons 
:mposed by internal and external constraints. The po licy also does not adaress the 
use of CBW by subnational or transnat ional organizations. The United States 
should adopt a policy which will both raise the cost and lower any benefits of CBW 
use. To shift the cost/benefit analysis against use of CBW in all cases requires a 
coordinated international and national program of deterrence through denial and 
deterrence by punishment 
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